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Abstract 
 
The public debt is at the centre of current crisis of the Peripheral European countries. 
Presently, the public debt to GDP ratio in Romania reached its maximum ever 
record. The objective of this paper is to provide a better understanding of public debt 
dynamics in Romania in the period from the first quarter of 2000 to the second quarter 
of 2011, which covers both prior and subsequent time periods to the recent financial 
crisis that started in August 2007. It decomposes changes in public debt to GDP ratio 
into macroeconomic components attributable to primary fiscal deficits, real interest rate, 
real GDP growth, and to the gains or losses on foreign currency denominated debt as 
result of exchange rate variation. The research findings suggest that the reaction of the 
public debt to GDP ratio to the real growth rate of the output increased after the 
financial crisis, which is especially harmful since the financial turmoil caused a deep 
recession. The real interest rate on government bonds remained an important 
determinant of public debt in the whole sample period. In addition, we find a limited 
effectiveness of fiscal policy as an automatic stabiliser through the whole sample 
period. Also, contrary to what happened with the leu-dollar exchange rate, variations in 
the leu-euro exchange rate didn’t have a significant impact on the variation of the debt 
to GDP ratio.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The public debt is at the centre of current crisis of the Peripheral European 
countries like Greece, Ireland and Portugal that have already been intervened by the 
European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. Meanwhile, financial markets are showing doubts about the ability of Spain and 
Italy to fulfil its obligations towards its creditors without a similar intervention.  
Governments may accumulate public debt to finance public and productive 
investment, for example in physical infrastructures and in human capital by public 
spending in education and health care. Also, in advance economies, the existence of 
developed social safety nets partially financed by public deficits that respond, for 
example, to the increase of the unemployment rate has an important role as economic 
automatic stabilisers. Public debt can increase in these circumstances to avoid distorting 
taxes fluctuations (see Barro, 1979).  
Nonetheless, increasing public debt and budget deficits have become a crucial 
issue in many industrialized and emerging economies. In recent decades, many 
countries have accumulated large stocks of public debt, usually followed by increases in 
public sector size and imprudent fiscal and budgetary policies. These developments 
raised concerns about debt sustainability with the possible consequences of debt 
monetization that originates inflation, tax rises and/or expenditures cuts that entail large 
economic costs, or in extreme cases sovereign debt default.  
Romania, a recent joiner to the European Union (EU),3 in spite of retaining its 
ability to devaluate the currency, is greatly suffering as a consequence of the Euro Zone 
crisis, and presently the country’s public debt reached its maximum ever record forcing 
the government to apply austerity measures and to borrow from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  
The objective of this paper is to provide a better understanding of public debt 
dynamics in Romania in the period from the first quarter of 2000 to the second quarter 
of 2011, which covers both prior and subsequent time periods to the recent financial 
crisis that started in August 2007.  
Our empirical strategy is: first, to decompose changes in public debt to GDP 
ratio into macroeconomic components attributable to primary fiscal deficits, real interest 
                                           
3 Romania joined the EU in 2007.  
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rate, real GDP growth, and to the gains or losses on foreign currency denominated debt 
as result of exchange rate variation; second, to analyse the contribution of each factor to 
the debt dynamics. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly describes the recent 
evolution of public debt in Romania, as well as its structure; section 3 describes the 
model to be tested and the used data set; section 4 presents and discusses the estimated 
results. Finally, section 5 draws some final conclusions.  
 
 
2. Recent Dynamics of Romania’s Public Debt 
 
Public debt as a percentage of the GDP in Romania reached 34.3 percent in the 
second quarter of 2011, which is still rather low by international standards (see Figure 
1).  
 
Figure 1. Public Debt to GDP Ratio in the EU (Second Quarter of 2011) 
 
Source: IMF 
 
Despite this fact, it is known that debt intolerance thresholds vary across 
countries, being determined by the country’s record of default and inflation, and by 
weak fiscal structures and financial systems (see e.g., Reinhart et al., 2003). For 
example, the IMF World Economic Outlook (2003) states that fiscal policy as a 
countercyclical tool is less effective in countries with high public debt: for industrial 
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countries it is defined as above 75 percent of GDP, and for emerging markets – such as 
Romania - as above 25 percent of GDP.  
Also, the currency composition of the debt and its maturity structure are relevant 
to access the vulnerability of a country to a debt crisis.4  
In fact, even a moderate debt to GDP ratio can hide unsustainable public debt 
dynamics when a large share of public debt is denominated in foreign currency. When 
such is the case, countries are highly vulnerable to the devaluation of the domestic 
currency. In Romania the share of the domestic currency denominated debt has 
increased until 2008, and remained stable after that. In 2010 there is still a larger share 
of debt denominated in foreign currency (60 percent) than in lei (see Figure 2).  
Furthermore, a large share of short-term debt exposes a country to interest rate 
volatility, making public debt very sensitive to the increase in the interest rates. After 
showing a tendency to decrease in the beginning of the decade of 2000, the share of 
short-term debt increased again after 2006, due to the budget’s necessity to borrow 
resources in order to be able to ensure current expense pay, such as the budgetary 
salaries and the pensions. In 2010 about 20 percent of the public debt has maturity less 
than one year (see Figure 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
4
 See World Bank (2005), Public Debt and Its Determinants in Market Access Countries. 
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 Figure 2. Public Debt Structure: Domestic vs. Foreign Currency Denominated Debt 
a)  
 
b) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 3. Public Debt Maturity Structure 
a)  
 
b) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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 At the beginning of the 90s, Romania recorded a consolidated value of public 
debt lower than the other former planned economies such as Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland. In the period 1992-1995 it showed stable values of 15-17 percent of the 
GDP. 
A large increase of the debt to GDP ratio occurred after 1995. In the period 
1996-1997, it increased by about 16 percent. The cause was the increase of the external 
indebtedness in these two years by 12.2 percent. By this time, public debt to GDP ratio 
had already exceeded the same macroeconomic indicator in the Czech Republic, and the 
difference to Poland and Hungary was reduced significantly. In the period from 1995 to 
2001, the debt to GDP ratio grew considerably from 7 percent, recorded in 1995, to 
about 26 percent in 2001.   
The public debt to GDP ratio declined steadily from the last quarter of 2002 until 
the more acute phase of the recent financial crisis following the Lehman Brother 
Collapse in September 15 of 2008 (reaching de decade record low of 11.6 percent of the 
GDP in the third quarter of 2008), in line with the requirements of the Stability and 
Growth Pact of the EU. The reasons for this sharp reduction were the economic and 
fiscal reforms implemented towards the accession to EU, the increase of the growth rate 
of the GDP, and a deceleration in issuing new debt. After that, it climbed sharply to 
34.3 percent of the GDP in the second quarter of 2011 (see Figure 4).  
From visual inspection of Figure 5 emerges as the main cause the sharp decline 
in the GDP growth rates that implies a significant fall in tax revenues. For example, in 
2008 the economic growth was 7.3 percent of the GDP, while in 2009 the economy 
contracted by 7.1 percent of GDP, as the result of the financial crisis that reduced 
domestic and Foreign demand. This conclusion is indeed in line with the findings of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a, b) that documented that after a deep financial crisis, public 
debt increases on average 86 percent, the cause being mainly the fall in the fiscal 
revenues due to slow GDP growth rate or even recession. Additional determinants of 
the increase of public debt were the higher interest rates on the foreign markets (LIBOR 
and EURIBOR), higher yields on government securities (see Figure 5 c.), the more 
restricted access to external financing on international markets, and the exchange rate 
depreciation against the major foreign currencies in the government debt portfolio like 
the euro and the dollar (see Figure 5 d.).5   
                                           
5
 See Public Debt Management Strategy 2011-2013, Ministry of Public Finance – General 
Directorate for Treasury and Public Debt. 
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Figure 4. Romania’ Public Debt to GDP Ratio  
 
Source: IMF 
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Figure 5.  Determinants of Public Debt Dynamics 
a. 
Primary Surplus to GDP Ratio 
  b. 
Real GDP Growth Rate 
  
 
c. 
Real Interest Rate on Public Debt 
 
d. 
Exchange Rates 
  
 
Source: IMF 
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3. Model and Data Set 
 
 
The background of our empirical model is the government budget constraint 
equation in each period t: 
 
 =  −  + 1 + 
 × 
 + 1 + 
 × 
 ×  − ∆                (1)         
 
According to equation (1), the variation of total public debt at period t, , depends on 
the current primary deficit (non interest total general government expenditures during 
period t, , minus total general government revenue during period t, ), on the public 
debt incurring in the past, including the interest payments on government borrowing, 
, and on changes of the monetary base, ∆. As Romania is issuing debt in local 
currency, as well as in foreign currency (the main foreign currencies in the government 
debt portfolio are the euro and the dollar), we split the sovereign debt inherent from the 
period (t-1) into domestic,  , and foreign currency denominated debt,  . In 
Equation (1),    is the nominal interest rate applied to domestic denominated debt,  
is the nominal interest rate applied to foreign currency denominated debt, and   is the 
nominal exchange rate defined as lei per foreign currency.       
   
  It is standard to write the government budget constraint in a form that expresses 
the evolution of debt to GDP ratio in terms of the ratio of the primary deficit to GDP, 
the real interest rate, and the GDP growth rate. Diving both sides of equation (1) by 
nominal GDP, neglecting debt monetization,6 and defining lower case variables as 
upper case variables expressed as a proportion of GDP, we can rewrite equation (1) as 
the public debt dynamics equation:  
 
 −  =  −  + 
 −  −  × 
 + 
 −  −  +  × 
        (2)                                
  
where    is the inflation rate, and  is the rate of growth of real GDP. 
                                           
6
 This simplification is acceptable as the European Union Framework for conducting monetary 
policy restricts the direct monetization of public debt by National Central Banks.      
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Equation (2) decomposes the change in public debt to GDP into three 
components: i) the primary fiscal balance,  − ; ii) the real interest rates, 
 

 −  
and  − ; iii) the real GDP growth rate, ; and iv) the nominal exchange rate, . 
Accordingly, the public debt to GDP ratio changes as a result of: the primary deficit; the 
‘automatic debt dynamics’ determined by the real interest rate on public debt and by the 
real rate of growth of the GDP; the capital gains or losses on foreign currency 
denominated debt as the result of exchange rate variation.    
  
Based on equation (2), we estimated by OLS and using the Newey-West 
procedure (Newey and West, 1987) to correct the eventual problems of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation the following model:    
 
∆ =   +  +  !"#!$" + %#&# + '!# +
                       ()*" + )*"# + +,+-                                                         (3)       
 
 
where ∆ is the variation of total amount of public debt as a percentage of GDP at 
period t,  is the public debt as a percentage of GDP in the previous period, 
!"#!$" is the primary government surplus as percentage of GDP, #&# is the real 
average interest rate paid on public debt, !# is the real rate of GDP growth, 
)*" is the leu – dollar exchange rate defined as the number of lei per dollar, 
)*"# is the leu – euro exchange rate defined as the number of lei per euro, ,., is a 
vector of other control variables, and - is a random disturbance term. The vector of 
control variables includes: the degree of openness of the economy at current prices, 
measured as total trade (sum of imports and exports) as a percentage of GDP, /!0; 
the  net foreign direct investment as percentage of GDP, 1&; and a set of dummy 
variables, $*, $*1 ,  $*2  and $*3 that are (1) if there is a 
parliamentary election in a given quarter, and in one, two or three quarters ahead 
respectively, and (0) otherwise. Trade openness is a variable very often present in fiscal 
policy models since early times (see, e.g., Cameron, 1978; and Myrdal, 1960). 
Openness should have a positive effect on economic growth which contributes to the 
reduction of the debt to GDP ratio (Berg and Krueger, 2003). The reason for the 
inclusion of 1& is that it leads to an increase of productivity and consequently to a 
12 
 
decrease of the debt to GDP ratio. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), e.g., found that this 
variable is relevant to explain the debt to GDP ratio in low and middle income 
countries. The election dummies are included to verify the so called opportunistic 
hypothesis that states that incumbent governments inflate the economy prior to elections 
in order do maximize their probabilities of being re-elected; hence producing political 
business cycles (see the early contributions of Nordhaus (1975), Lindbeck (1975), 
Hibbs (1977), and MacRae (1977). Further contributions can be found in Alesina and 
Roubini (1992), Rogoff (1990), and Shi and Svensson (2006). The empirical literature 
on this hypothesis remains, however, rather inconclusive (see Schneider, 2010).   
Then, following Barro (1979) and Bohn (1998), we admit that the primary 
deficit is a function of temporary government expenditures, defined as the difference 
between non interest government spending as percentage of GDP, , and its trend, ̅, 
computed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, and as a function of the cyclical state of the 
economy, defined as the difference between the unemployment rate, ", and its 
Hodrick-Prescott trend, "5. The output gap is an alternative to the unemployment gap. 
However, unemployment rate has several advantages (Fernandes and Mota, 2011): It is 
more objective in its quantification; It is available to the public in general on a monthly 
basis; and it is waited by the markets as a good indicator of the state of the economy. 
Moreover, since it directly affects the well-being of the electors and their opinions of 
the government, politicians feel obliged to respond to it by means of appropriate 
discretionary fiscal policy.   
To account for a structural break after 2007 caused by the recent financial crisis, 
we add an interaction term between the explanatory variables and a dummy variable, 
*#&&.,. The Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint test (Andrews, 1993; Andrews 
and Ploberger, 1994) indicates a structural break in the regression in the first quarter of 
2009 (where the LR F-statistic reaches a maximum of 5.679 – see Figure 6). 
Accordingly, *#&&., takes the value of (1) for all the quarters after the first quarter of 
2009, and (0) for the quarters before.  
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Figure 6. Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint test 
(LR F-statistic) 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
In the estimation, we use quarterly date from IMF – International Financial 
Statistics, BOPS – Balance of Payments, GFS – Government Finance Statistics and 
Coordinated Direct Investment Survey, electronic databases provided by International 
Monetary Fund. The data covers the period from the first quarter of 2000 to the second 
quarter of 2011, which inlcludes both prior and subsequent time periods to the recent 
financial crisis that started in August 2007. All the variables were seasonally adjusted.  
The summary descriptive statistics are in Table 1. The dynamics of public debt 
to GDP ratio is displayed in Figure 4, and the main determinants of public debt are 
displayed in Figure 5. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable Mean Standard  
Deviation 
Max Min 
Variation (%)  
2000:01 – 2011:02  
 20.3 6.0 34.3 11.6 50.44 
!1&*& -0.3 3.4 5.9 -12.1 10.21 
 36.3 5.6 48.7 24.7 -16.11 
" 7.0 2.3 12.9 3.8 -54.37 
#&# 4.291 2.954 11.040 -4.554 232.46 
!# 3.8 4.9 11.6 -8.6 -87.63 
)*"6 2.901 0.387 3.381 1.866 54.18 
)*"# 3.535 0.694 4.539 1.790 113.58 
/!0* 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.7 26.86 
1& 4.8 3.1 11.2 0.4 38.42 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
  
         
4. The Estimated Results 
 
 
Table 2 (column) presents the estimation results of the effect of the primary 
fiscal balance, the real interest rates, the real GDP growth, and the exchange rate 
variation on the dynamics of public debt (Equation 3). This is our baseline model. The 
regression is overall significant and the signs of the main explanatory variables are 
those that are expected. An increase of the primary surplus to GDP ratio originates a 
reduction in the public debt to GDP ratio, while an increase of the real interest rate and a 
decrease of the GDP growth rate originate a positive variation of the debt to GDP ratio. 
The debt in the previous period does not have a significant impact on the variation of 
the debt in the current period. This result means that governments didn’t show any 
urgency to react to the increase of debt to GDP ratio. Concerning the exchange rate 
variations, the leu-dollar exchange rate is significant and with the expect sign, meaning 
that a devaluation of the leu against the dollar increases the debt to GDP ratio, while the 
leu-euro exchange rate is non-significant. Among the control variables, only foreign 
direct investment is significant, implying that an influx of capital contributes to reduce 
the public debt to GDP ratio. The degree of openness of the economy is not significant, 
and we also didn’t find electoral cycles in the behaviour of public debt.         
15 
 
Based on this estimation, we decompose the public debt dynamics into its 
significant components7 (see Figure 7). Our results show that the real GDP growth rate 
contributed to a reduction of the debt to GDP ratio until the beginning of the financial 
turmoil. After that, the recession has been contributing to the increase of the debt ratio. 
Before the recent financial turmoil, foreign direct was also an important factor that 
contributed to the reduction of the public debt. Nonetheless, its effect diminished 
considerably after 2008. The leu-dollar exchange rate contributed to the reduction of 
public debt from 2002 to 2008. After the crisis, the devaluation of the leu increased the 
domestic value of the foreign currency denominated debt, leading to an increase of the 
debt to GDP ratio. The real interest rate on public debt contributed to the increase in 
debt to GDP ratio throughout in the whole period, and its effect increased after 2008. 
Primary budget had an impact either positive or negative to the public debt 
accumulation through the period, but nonetheless its contribution is relatively small. 
This result hasn’t changed very much after 2008, which is an indicator of the limited 
importance of the automatic stabilisers in Romania.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
7
 We follow the methodology of the World Bank (2005). Public Debt and Its Determinants in 
Market Access Countries.  
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Table 2. Estimation Results 
(Dependent variable: quarterly change of the debt to GDP ratio) 
Variables 
Model I  
Baseline 
Model II  
Cyclical State of  the 
Economy 
Model III 
Crisis 
Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef.  t-statistic 
 0.509  0.256  1.127  0.486  0.094  0.098  
 0.0003  0.008   0.029 0.601  -0.037 -1.032  
!"#!$" -0.086*  -1.897  - - - - 
" − "5 - -  -0.179 -0.470  - - 
 − ̅ - - 0.067* 1.844   0.003 0.124  
#&# 0.183**  2.627  0.221*** 3.270   -0.076 -1.031  
!# -0.087**  -2.231  -0.096** -2.003   0.087* 1.922  
)*"  2.719** 2.343  2.998*** 2.823   4.575*** 2.786  
)*" -0.193 -0.197 -0.163 -0.147 - - 
/!0* -0.374 -0.120 -2.118 -0.650 - - 
1& -0.133* -1.751 -0.114 -1.492 -0.009 -0.184 
$* -0.381 -1.337 -0.421 -1.189 - - 
$*1 0.460 0.675 0.490 0.722 - - 
$*2 0.014 0.033 0.041 0.092 - - 
$*3 0.390 0.566 0.236 0.310 - - 
 × *#&& - - - - 0.076*** 3.055 
" − "5 × *#&& - - - - - - 
 − ̅ × *#&& - - - - 0.254*** 3.204 
#&# × *#&& - - - - 0.432*** 3.981 
!# × *#&& - - - - -0.236*** -3.375 
)*" × *#&& - - - - 2.146 -0.618 
1& × *#&& - - - - -0.509 -1.632 
R2 0.573 0.572   0.768 
DW 2.659 2.617  2.738 
F-statistic 3.237  2.879  5.803 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively (We used the Newey-West 
procedure to account for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Figure 7.  Determinants of Public Debt Dynamics 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
(Note: Each column represents the contribution of each 
factor to quarterly change of the debt to GDP ratio. A 
positive value means that a given factor contributed to an 
increase of the debt to GDP ratio. A negative value means 
that a given factor contributed to a decrease of the debt to 
GDP ratio)     
 
 
Then we replace the primary surplus to GDP ratio by the temporary government 
expenditures and the cyclical state of the economy (see Table 2, column II). Between 
the two considered determinants of primary surplus, only the temporary expenditures 
variable is significant implying deficit spending in periods of economic downturn. 
However, the non-significance of the cyclical unemployment variable indicates a 
limited ability of conducting counter-cyclical fiscal policy by the Romanian authorities. 
 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Primary budget
Real interest rate on government debt 
Real growth rate  
RON-USD exchange rate variation
FDI
18 
 
Model III analyses whether there is a structural break in the relation between 
public debt growth and its determinants caused by the recent financial crisis. The results 
are in Table 2, column III. We consider only the significant variables included in 
Models I and II.  We find that the coefficient of the lagged public debt to GDP ratio 
turns significant and positive after 2008, while it is negative, although not significant 
before 2007. This implies that after the financial crisis hit the world economy in the fall 
of 2007, the debt to GDP exhibits more persistence. We also find that temporary 
expenditures have a greater impact on the variation of public debt (we read the reaction 
of public debt after 2008 as the sum of the estimated coefficients of  − ̅  
and  − ̅  × *#&&). The increasing difficult of accessing international financial 
markets and the increase of the interest rates are also reflected in greater reaction of 
public debt to the real interest rate on public debt after 2008 (we read the reaction of 
public debt after 2008 as the sum of the estimated coefficients of  #&# and #&# ×
*#&&). Finally, the impact of the growth rate of GDP also increased after 2008 (we 
read the reaction of public debt after 2008 as the sum of the estimated coefficients of 
!# and !# × *#&&), which is especially negative since GDP fell sharply 
after this period.   
 
 
5. Conclusions 
  
 
The objective of our study was the analysis of the factors that determine the debt 
to GDP ratio in Romania.  We found out that the primary fiscal balance, the real interest 
rate, the real GDP growth rate, and leu-dollar exchange rate variation are significant, 
while the leu-euro exchange rate is not. This result gives empirical support for the 
government intention8 to increase the share of public debt expressed in domestic 
currency and to increase the euro denominated government debt share in total foreign 
currency government debt in order to limit the currency risk of the debt portfolio.  
We also verify that the government has a limited ability of using fiscal policy as 
an automatic stabiliser on the basis on the non-significance of the coefficient of the 
                                           
8
 See Public Debt Management Strategy 2011-2013, Ministry of Public Finance – General 
Directorate for Treasury and Public Debt, p. 15. 
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variation of public debt on the cyclical unemployment rate, which is indeed common in 
emergent economies such as Romania. 
  Finally, we found an increasing reaction of the public debt to macroeconomic 
determinants such as the GDP growth rate after the financial crisis, which implies that 
restoring the conditions for growth and to reduce the interest rate risks are of 
fundamental importance to control the public debt.  
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